Iceland illustrates why political ‘hectoring’ from foreign countries is bound to fail in Greece by Danielsson, Jon
Credit: Ben Bodien (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
8/19/2015
Iceland illustrates why political ‘hectoring’ from foreign
countries is bound to fail in Greece
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/08/19/iceland-illustrates-why-political-hectoring-from-foreign-countries-is-bound-to-fail-in-greece/
Iceland entered a period of ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, with the country subsequently involved in a
prolonged dispute over losses generated in the Netherlands and the UK by an Icelandic bank. Jon
Danielsson writes that the crisis in Iceland has much in common with the ongoing crisis in Greece,
not least the heavy pressure exerted on both countries by foreign governments. He argues that just
as in Iceland, this pressure has been counterproductive in Greece, hardening opposition to any
potential settlement.
In observing what has been happening in Greece, I am struck by many parallels with the Icelandic
crisis. The two crises demonstrate that the commonalities in crisis tend to be bigger than the diﬀerences. Leaving
the economics aside, here I want to focus on the political and international relations aspects, and in particular how
the Icelandic Icesave dispute has many echoes in how the Greek crisis is playing out and the impact of subjecting
debt agreements to referenda.
A brief background to the Icesave dispute
I have discussed this before, so here is just a brief synopsis. An Icelandic bank, regulated and deposit insured in
Iceland, when rejected by professional creditors in 2007 opted to get funding by opening online branches in Britain
and the Netherlands, under the name of Icesave. It was quite successful, not least because it oﬀered above market
interest rates.
However, ultimately the professionals proved right
and the bank failed in October 2008. This was at the
height of the Global Crisis, and the UK and Dutch
authorities opted to unilaterally bail out Icesave’s
retail depositors, motivated by a desire to prevent
even more disruption to ﬁnancial markets.
After spending €3.9 billion on the bailout, the British
and Dutch tried to claim the money back from the
Icelandic deposit insurance fund. They found it
lacking and hence wanted the Icelandic government
to repay them instead. It hesitated, after all this
amounted to 42 per cent of GDP and a sovereign
default was looming.
However, the legal case was always uncertain and
when the case was ultimately decided by
international courts, it ruled in Iceland’s favour.
Ultimately, it turned out to be a storm in a teacup, the
estate of Icesave had more than enough money to make everybody whole. The British and the Dutch governments
even proﬁted from the whole thing.
Dictating an Icesave deal
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The government of Iceland initially accepted the British and the Dutch claims and assembled a team to negotiate the
terms. They were heavily outgunned. At the time, I likened this to Iceland sending my local ﬁrst division football
team, Grotta, to play against Manchester United. The Icelanders soon realised that the agreement was lacking and
that its authorities were less than competent in their negotiations with the foreign powers. Opposition to the Icesave
agreement started to build and an acrimonious debate started, both domestically and with the outside world.
At the time, Iceland came under very strong pressure from every relevant government to give in. Trade sanctions
were threatened, the IMF held up its aid package to force Iceland to accept the claim, and Iceland’s main
international friend, Norway, took on the role of main enforcer. The Icelanders got the impression that they stood
alone against the world, with Poland being the only country oﬀering support. In the debate, Britain kept a very low
proﬁle; I do not recall any of its politicians commenting on Icesave publicly.
It was diﬀerent in the Netherlands where Icesave became a major political issue. Two men stand out – the foreign
minister, Maxime Verhagen, and the ﬁnance minister, Wouter Bos. Both frequently commented on Icesave,
threatening Iceland if it did not pay back the Icesave money. Their domestic comments were immediately translated
into Icelandic, inﬂuencing public opinion. At the time, Iceland was negotiating with the EU for membership and Mr
Verhagen linked membership to Iceland accepting the Icesave obligations. The Dutch oﬃcials were joined by
political leaders from across Europe. Still, all this public hectoring was counterproductive.
There were several reasons for this. The pressure and public exhortations were perceived as unreasonable. The
Icelanders thought that the Dutch authorities were equally responsible; after all, they had been repeatedly warned
against allowing the Icesave bank to start operations. They worried that adding on a foreign currency debt of 42 per
cent of GDP might trigger a sovereign default. Ultimately, the Icelanders bristled at being dictated to by hectoring
foreign oﬃcials.
The desire for reform needs to come from within
So what does this have to do with Greece? The parallel is in how the international community pressured Iceland to
give in and how the Icelanders reacted to the pressure. Greece has been under continuous and very public pressure
to reform its economy. Leaving aside the question of whether these reforms are needed, all the public hectoring
seems to be quite counterproductive at least in terms of voter perceptions.
In their dealings with Greece, the foreign authorities have repeatedly and loudly told the Greek people they have to
reform, that their way of doing things is wrong and that the way of the foreigners is right. I don’t think this will work,
and the recent referendum clearly suggests that voters would like to take an even harder line than their current
leaders. This has ominous implications for the next election. After all, the Greek economy was collapsing when the
troika was being obeyed. Leaving aside the question of whether there is causality, the voters certainly did see one.
Referenda
Iceland has another factor in common with Greece – they are the only two countries that have subjected sovereign
debt settlements to a referendum, as analysed recently by Amber Curtis, Joseph Jupille and David Leblang. They
argue that while the vote was supposedly about economics and Europe, it really was about domestic politics and
the attitude of the voters toward the government. The outcomes therefore signal the political direction of the
countries.
In addition, attitudes towards national sovereignty played a key role in both countries. Nationalists were more likely
to say “no”, and the pro-European cosmopolitans “yes”. One long-term consequence of the Icesave dispute has
been the hardening of Iceland’s anti-European and isolationist views. And in the subsequent national elections, the
Icelanders voted in parties that had campaigned against both the Icesave deal and EU membership, including a
prime minister who built his career on the “no” vote.
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One important diﬀerence between the Icelandic and Greek referendums is that in the former case, the question was
clear and so were the consequences. In the Greek case that is not so, and this reﬂects the diﬀerences in the
outcome – 61 per cent of Greeks said no, and over 90 per cent of Icelanders.
Conclusion
The lesson from Iceland is that the population will instinctively reject foreign pressure. It doesn’t matter whether it is
sensible or not, so long as it is imposed, it will be resisted.
If the Greeks don’t want to reform their economy, the foreign authorities wanting that for them will be disabused. The
hectoring by foreign oﬃcials, who are addressing their own voters as much as the Greeks, is likely to be
counterproductive. At the end of the day, the will to reform needs to come from within, and the sooner the Troika
realises this, the easier it will be to deal with the Greek situation.
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